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I. Introduction
The past year, while relatively quiet on the legislative front, saw active
litigation of numerous oil and gas disputes in Pennsylvania courts and
administrative agencies. Notable issues included the proper application of
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment (Pa.
Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth); ongoing litigation and regulation
relating to Act 13 of 2012 (Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth and 78a
regulations); litigation over the use of eminent domain power by midstream
operators building pipelines (In re Sunoco cases); litigation over proper
zoning of oil and gas related uses (EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson
Hills); lease disputes (Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co.); and title disputes
(Cornwall Mountain Inv., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr.).
II. Legislative and Regulatory Update
Although numerous bills were proposed relating to oil and gas leases,
operations, and taxation, no substantive legislation was passed in the past
year.
The Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) finalized new
Chapter 78a regulations relating to the environmental impacts associated
with unconventional oil and gas operations. These new rules impose
additional burdens and restrictions on operations including heightened
design and engineering requirements for surface uses, phasing out of
surface impoundments and greater setbacks from schools and other public
facilities. New Chapter 78 regulations relating to conventional oil and gas
operations are in progress and scheduled for release in the third quarter of
2018.
III. Supreme Court Cases
A. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Fiscal Code provisions
relating to proceeds from state mineral leases violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, rejecting the established
test under the Amendment.
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The court broadened the scope of the Environmental Rights Amendment
to the Pennsylvania Constitution (“ERA”) by rejecting a forty-four-year-old
test used to determine the constitutionality of Commonwealth actions under
the ERA. 1 Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation (“PEDF”)
challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Fiscal Code that allowed
a portion of the revenues generated from leasing state lands to be diverted
to the General Fund without any condition or restriction that those revenues
be allocated to environmental conservation. 2
The ERA states the following: 3
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Since 1973, Pennsylvania courts applied a three-part test to
determine whether statutes or regulations violated the ERA. The test,
announced by the Commonwealth Court in Payne v. Kassab, asked:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's
public natural resources?
(2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the
environmental incursion to a minimum?
(3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the
challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to
be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse
of discretion? 4
The Commonwealth Court, reviewing PEDF’s challenge under the
Payne test, granted summary relief in favor of the Commonwealth,
upholding the code sections. 5 On appeal, the supreme court noted that it had

1. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
2. Id. at 921-22; see 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1602-E, 1603-E, 1604-E (West 2014) [the
“Code Sections”].
3. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
4. 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
5. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 928.
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affirmed the judgment in Payne, but “without adopting the three-part test.” 6
In reviewing the constitutionality of the code sections, the court took the
opportunity to reject the Payne test and invalidate 1602-E and 1603-E of
the Fiscal Code under the language of the ERA, itself, and private trust
principles.
The court found that the ERA grants two rights to the citizens of the
Commonwealth: the right to “clean air and pure water, and to the
preservation of natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment;” and “the common ownership by the people, including future
generations, of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.” 7 The third
sentence of the ERA establishes a public trust, of which the
Commonwealth, itself, is the trustee.8 Quoting the plurality decision in
Robinson Township, the Court described the duties of the trustee as
follows: 9
As trustee, the Commonwealth is a fiduciary obligated to comply
with the terms of the trust and with standards governing a
fiduciary's conduct. The explicit terms of the trust require the
government to “conserve and maintain” the corpus of the trust.
The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates
a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or
depletion of our public natural resources. As a fiduciary, the
Commonwealth has a duty to act toward the corpus of the trust—
the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty, and
impartiality.
The court held the code sections facially unconstitutional because “[t]hey
plainly ignore the Commonwealth’s constitutionally imposed fiduciary duty
to manage the corpus of the environmental public trust for the benefit of the
people to accomplish its purpose—conserving and maintaining the corpus
by, inter alia, preventing and remedying the degradation, diminution and
depletion of our public natural resources.” 10

6. Id. at 927 (citing Payne v. Kassab, 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976)).
7. Id. at 931.
8. Id. at 932.
9. Id. (citing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901, 956-57 (Pa.
2013)) (internal citations omitted).
10. Id. at 938.
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B. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the provisions of Act 13 of
2012 providing for review of local zoning ordinance by the Pennsylvania
Utility Commission were non-severable from unconstitutional provisions
by prior decision of the court and section authorizing taking of real property
for storage of natural gas was unconstitutional because it violated the public
use requirement.
The court’s decision was the latest arising from challenges brought
against Act 13 of 2012, which amended the Oil and Gas Act to provide for
limitations on local zoning ordinances regulating oil and gas operations.
Robinson II (an appeal from the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court’s
decision in Robinson I) 11 held that the statutory requirement that zoning
ordinances permit oil and gas operations in all zoning districts was
unconstitutional (the plurality decision relying upon the “Environmental
Rights Amendment,” Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution). 12 In Robinson III, the Commonwealth Court held on remand
that provisions providing for review of local ordinances by the
Pennsylvania Utility Commission (the “PUC”) were not severable from the
invalid provisions. 13
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
Commonwealth Court’s holding that Sections 3305 through 3309
(providing for review of ordinances by the PUC and loss of well impact
fees for municipalities that enact violative ordinances) of Act 13 were not
severable from sections 3303 and 3304 (restricting local zoning of oil and
gas operations). 14 The court concluded that if not for the new restrictions on
local regulation of oil and gas operations, the legislature would not have
passed the provisions providing for PUC review, and the penalties on local
municipalities were inextricably linked to the stricken provisions.15
The supreme court next held that parts of Section 3222.1 of Act 13
protecting trade secrets and confidential proprietary information violated
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition of “special laws.”16 The court
further held that Section 3218.1’s exclusion of private water supplies from

11. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
12. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901 (2013).
13. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 96 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
14. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 542 (Pa. 2016).
15. Id. at 566 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1925; Heller v. Frankston, 504 Pa. 528, 475
A.2d 1291, 1295 (1984)).
16. Id. at 576.
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spill notice requirements was an unsupportable “special law” that must be
stricken in its entirety, but stayed its striking for a period of 180 days to
give the legislature an opportunity to revise the provision. 17
In the final part of its decision, the court examined Section 3241 of the
Act, which provided that corporations that transport, sell or store natural
gas had the right to appropriate interest in real property located in a storage
reservoir or buffer zone. Plaintiffs claimed that the Section violated the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the provision was not limited
to takings for public purposes. 18 The Commonwealth argued that the
provision should be interpreted to be limited to public utility corporations. 19
The supreme court held that on its face the provision was not limited to
public utility corporations, which are limited to those corporations that
produce, transmit, distribute or furnish natural gas “for the public for
compensation.” 20 The court held that Section 3241 provided for
unconstitutional takings under the United States Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 21
IV. Superior Court Cases
A. Birdie Associates, L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 149 A.3d 367 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2016).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that coal operators were not liable
to a coal lessor for operating and producing coalbed methane, concluding
that the operator was not required to mine coal under a lease providing for
annual minimum royalties.
In 1985, lessors Ethel Spragg, Joan Spragg Wemlinger and David L.
Wermlinger leased unto Consol Land Development Company the coal
under a tract of land containing 289.91 acres, for a term of 20 years and an
option to renew for an additional 20-year term. CLDC exercised its option
to renew and extended the lease until 2025. Lessee paid the advanced
minimum royalty but mined no coal from the premises and had no plans to
do so in the near future. 22

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 583.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 585-86.
See id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Birdie Assocs., L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., 149 A.3d 367, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
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In 2010, successor lessor filed a complaint, alleging unjust enrichment
because the operators were producing and marketing coalbed methane
(“CBM”) from the leased property but not making any additional payments
to the lessor. The court noted first that “[t]itle to CBM is vested in the
owner of the coal.” 23 The 1985 lease was silent as to CBM or royalties
resulting from the sale of CBM. 24 Lessor argued that the lease violated the
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”), 58 P.S. § 33.3, as lessee
was not paying lessor one-eighth of all gas produced.
Operator argued that it was the owner of the coal and as such did not
have to pay a royalty on the CBM. The court noted the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania recognized the established rule in Pennsylvania “that the lease
of coal in place with the right to mine and remove all of it for a stipulated
royalty vests in the lessee a fee.” 25 Therefore, “if the fee to the severed coal
is vested in the lessee no interest in the coal as real property remains in the
lessor and . . . his only interest therein is personal property. 26 The lessor’s
interest in the lease is properly termed a possibility of reverter.” 27 Lessor
argued that the “Pennsylvania Doctrine” of a lease as a sale was outdated,
citing Olbum v. Old Home Manor, Inc. 28 The superior court agreed that a
coal deed does not always constitute a sale, but concluded that it did in this
case: “[a]s the trial court explained, the leases in question clearly conveyed
the ‘interest in and to all of the Pittsburgh seams or measures of coal and all
constituent products of such coal in and underlying’ the various lands in
Greene County.” Further, CBM “is doubtless a ‘constituent product’ of
coal.” 29
Lessor’s other arguments regarding the minimum royalty act and the fact
that lessees had not mined any coal or paid royalties aside from the
advanced minimum royalty were dismissed because the owner of the coal
was under no obligation to pay royalties on CBM nor under any obligation
to mine the coal. 30 Thus the court affirmed the trial court’s decision.31

23. Id. (citing U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 371-72 (quoting Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227 (1943)) (internal
quotations omitted).
26. Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 233 (1943)).
28. 459 A.2d 757 (1983).
29. Birdie Assocs., 149 A.3d at 374 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 375.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

790

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

B. Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 158 A.3d
148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a 1932 tax deed of interest
assessed as “minerals only” conveyed severed oil and gas rights.
Cornwall Mountain Investments, L.P. (“Plaintiff”), filed a quiet title
action against defendant owners (“Defendants”) of interests reserved in an
1894 deed relating to “unseated” (meaning undeveloped for tax purposes)
tracts in Lycoming County comprising 2,842 acres.32 That deed reserved
“all the natural gas, coal, coal oil, petroleum, marble and all minerals of
every kind and character in, upon, or under said land.” 33
The Lycoming County assessment office records indicated that the
reserved mineral rights were not assessed until 1930 and 1931, when they
were assessed in the name of “Thomas E. Proctor & Heirs.”34 In 1932,
Cornwall Mountain Club, the surface owner, bought the mineral rights at a
tax sale. 35 The mineral rights were later conveyed to Plaintiff in 2010. 36 The
Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County ruled in favor of the Plaintiff,
and Defendants appealed. 37
Defendants argued that the tax assessments of “minerals rights only” did
not include the reserved oil and gas, and consequently the 1932 tax deed did
not convey the oil and gas to plaintiff’s predecessor. 38 Defendants cited
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 620 Pa. 1 (2013), which reaffirmed the “Dunham Rule” (from Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36
(1882)), which stands for the proposition that a reference to “minerals” in a
reservation in a deed does not include oil and gas.39
The superior court concluded that Butler affirmed the continued vitality
of the rebuttable presumption of the Dunham Rule, but only with regard to
reservations in conveyances between private individuals. 40 The superior
court instead held that a tax deed conveys all interests properly included
within the assessment, which in this instance included the oil and gas.41
32. Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 158 A.3d 148, 151
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 151-52.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 156.
41. Id. (citing Bannard v. N.Y. State Nat. Gas Corp., 448 Pa. 239 (1972)).
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The court rejected defendants’ second contention: that the oil and gas
was not taxable because the oil and gas was not being produced at the time
of the tax sale. 42 The superior court relied upon the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s holding in Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d
358 (Pa. 2016). Defendants also argued that the oil and gas was not taxable
under Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals
of Fayette Cty., 572 Pa. 240 (2002), which ruled that oil and gas was not
subject to property tax assessment. The superior court held that the holding
of IOGA was prospective only, relying upon Oz Gas, Ltd. v. Warren Area
Sch. Dist., 595 Pa. 128 (2007). 43
Finally, the superior court rejected claims that the tax sales were
constitutionally deficient (again citing Herder Spring Hunting Club v.
Keller) 44 and that the tax sales were procedurally deficient, holding that the
applicable statute of limitations barred non-jurisdictional attacks on the tax
sales. 45
C. Murphy v. Karnek Family Partners LP & Range Res. Appalachia, LLC,
160 A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
The superior court held that (1) a surface deed did not alter the initial
vestment of oil and gas rights in grantor wife for life and remainder in her
grantor husband and (2) a devise of “real estate property” included oil and
gas.
Joe Krynovske (“Joe”) and Bessie Krynovske (“Bessie”), husband and
wife, (collectively, the “Krynovskes”) acquired the Subject Property in
1931. 46 In 1938, the Krynovskes conveyed the property to a third party,
who then conveyed the Subject Property back to Joe, subject to the
following language: “Excepting and reserving hereout and herefrom all the
oil and gas in or underlying said parcel of ground. . . .” 47 Through a
separate deed, the third party conveyed all the oil and gas to Bessie “for and
during the term of her natural life, with remainder in fee to Joe.” 48 In 1939,
the Krynovskes conveyed the Subject Property with the same oil and gas
exception and reservation language contained in the earlier deed and added
the following language: “This conveyance is also made under and subject to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 157 (citing Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 143 A.3d 358 (Pa. 2016)).
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 160-61 (citing Trexler v. Africa, 33 Pa. Super. 395, 410 (1907)).
Murphy v. Karnek, 160 A.3d 850, 853 (Pa. Super Ct. 2017).
Id.
Id.
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a deed of A. Kirk Wrenshall to Bessie Krynovske dated September 1,
1938 . . . by which conveyance all of the oil and gas rights were conveyed
to the said Bessie Krynovske” (the “Surface Deed”).49 Joe died intestate in
1959, survived by Bessie and their five children.50 Bessie died testate in
1963, and devised unto her daughter, Helen Goodman, all her real estate. 51
The will listed certain property, but did not include the oil and gas within
and underlying the Subject Property. 52 Helen Goodman died testate in
1987, devising “all the rest, residue and remainder” of her estate to her
brother, Steve Karnek, Sr. 53 Steve died intestate in 1988, survived by his
widow, Lucy Karnek, and his son, Steven Karneck, Jr. (the “Karneks”). 54
Lucy and Steve then conveyed all of their interests in the property to
Karneck Family Partners, LP and in 2014 the property was leased to Range
Resources Appalachia, LLC. 55
The grandchildren of Joe and Bessie brought a quiet title action
regarding the ownership of oil and gas rights in the Subject Property
previously owned by their grandparents, arguing that (1) Bessie’s life estate
and Joe’s remainder interest remained intact after the execution of the
Surface Deed, (2) Bessie inherited 1/3 of Joe’s remainder interest at his
death with the five children inheriting the remaining 2/3 interest, (3) the
five children inherited Bessie’s interest equally at her death, and (4) when
the five children died, their interests passed according to their wills or
intestacy laws. 56 The Karneks filed a counterclaim, also asking for quiet
title, arguing that (1) the Surface Deed caused the oil and gas rights to be
owned by Joe and Bessie as tenants by the entireties, (2) Bessie inherited
100% at Joe’s death, (3) Bessie devised 100% to her daughter, Helen, (4)
Helen devised 100% to her brother, Steve, and (5) Steve’s interest was
inherited by his widow and son who conveyed their interest to Karnek
Family Partners. 57 Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment;
the Washington County Court of Common Pleas dismissed the parties’
cross motions for summary judgment, determined the ownership interests,

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855-56.
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and ordered Range to pay rents and royalties accordingly. 58 Both parties
appealed. 59
On appeal, the court examined the Surface Deed language and the
interpretation of Bessie’s will. When interpreting deeds, “the court’s
primary objective must be to ascertain and effectuate what the parties
intended.” 60 The Surface Deed’s exception and reservation clause was
identical to the exception and reservation language in the 1938 deed to
Joe. 61 While the terms “excepted” and “reserved” are often used
interchangeably, the intent of the parties actually governs whether the
language creates an exception or a reservation. A reservation is the creation
of a right or interest that did not previously exist; therefore, in this case
Bessie’s life estate existed before the Surface Deed, so no new interest in
the oil and gas was created. 62 The plain language of the Surface Deed
stated that the deed was “under and subject” to Bessie’s life estate.63 The
court concluded that until Joe’s death, Bessie had a life estate and Joe had a
remainder interest in and to the oil and gas.64
The grandchildren argued that under Bessie’s will, the Subject Property
was not devised to Helen, but passed by intestacy to her five children
equally, since Bessie’s will did not specifically mention the oil and gas
underlying the Subject Property. 65 When looking at the intent of testators,
“a court must focus first and foremost on the precise wording of the will,
and if ambiguity exists, on the circumstances under which the will was
executed.” 66 The court noted that “one who writes a will is presumed to
intend to dispose of all his estate and not to die intestate as to any portion
thereof.” 67 Bessie’s will stated, “I give, devise and bequeath all my real
estate property to my daughter, Helen.”68 The court concluded that the
devise of all the real estate included the oil and gas within and underlying
the Subject Property, and the individual property descriptions following the

58. Id. at 856.
59. Id.
60. Mackall v. Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
61. Murphy, 160 A.3d at 853.
62. Id. at 859.
63. See id. at 853-54.
64. Id. at 860.
65. Id. at 860-61.
66. In re Estate of Weaver, 392 Pa.Super. 312, 572 A.2d 1249, 1256, appeal denied 525
Pa. 659, 582 A.2d 325 (1990).
67. In re Grier’s Estate, 403 Pa. 517, 170 A.2d 545, 548 (1961).
68. Murphy, 160 A.3d at 854.
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grant did not limit or reduce the general devise. 69 This interpretation of the
will language was also consistent with the presumption against partial
intestacy. 70 The superior court affirmed the trial court’s order. 71
D. Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1046 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 2482850
(Pa. Super. Ct. June 8, 2017).
The superior court held that the non-apportionment language in the lease
was not nullified by later pooling and lesser interest clause modification.
Lessors’ and their neighbors’ (“Long,” “Schmidt” and “Schinkovec”)
properties were all originally owned by Hupp and were leased to Lessee in
1928 (“Hupp Lease”). 72 The Hupp Lease covered 96 acres, providing for a
five-year primary term and further “as long as the land was operated by the
lessee in search of, or in the production of, oil and gas.” 73 The Hupp Lease
was modified in 1951 to permit gas storage and again in 2009 to permit
pooling. 74 The 2009 modifications were executed through four separate
instruments with all of the current owners of the Hupp Lease. 75 Lessors’
modification incorrectly referenced the acreage as 75.66 acres, while the
other three modifications recognized the full 96 acres subject to the Hupp
Lease. 76 All four of the 2009 lease modifications included a pooling and
unitization clause, which stated the following:
There shall be allocated to the portion of the leased premises
included in any pooling such proportion of the actual production
from all lands so pooled as to such portion of the leased
premises, computed on an acreage basis, bears to the entire
acreage of the lands so pooled. . . . 77
The Lessors’ modification also included the following language: “In the
event lessors herein should own less than the entire undivided fee simple in
the property subject to the original oil and gas lease, then any royalties or

69. Id. at 862-63.
70. Id. at 863.
71. Id.
72. Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1046 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 2482850, at *2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. June 8, 2017).
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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rentals accruing under this lease, if any, shall be reduced
proportionally. . . .” 78
In 2011, Lessee unitized the Hupp Lease with other property for a unit
totaling 346.71 acres.79 Out of the 96 acres of the Hupp Lease, 76.15 acres
were included in the unit, with 75.15 acres owned by Lessors and 1 acre
owned by Long; Schinkovec and Schmidt owned nothing. 80 Even though
no Schinkovec land was pooled, Lessee assigned Schinkovec a 1.34% Net
Revenue Interest in the Unit. 81 Lessor brought a declaratory judgment
action against Lessee and Schinkovec, seeking an accounting and a
declaration that Lessee wrongly paid royalties to Schinkovec. 82 The Greene
County Court of Common Pleas granted Lessee and Schinkovec’s motion
for summary judgment. 83 Lessors appealed, challenging the trial court’s
interpretation of the Hupp Lease provisions and subsequent lease
modifications between the parties. 84
Pennsylvania law generally follows the rule of apportionment, whereby
each lessor “should receive such share of the royalty as his or her share of
the land bears to the whole tract covered by the lease. It does not matter on
what acre or hundred acres the wells may be situated.” 85 By contrast, the
Hupp Lease provided that in the event of a subdivision of the lease,
royalties were to be paid only to the owner of the wellsite tract (nonapportionment). 86 The Lessors’ 2009 modification included language
directing that royalties would be reduced proportionately in the event the
Lessees “should own less than the entire undivided fee simple estate in the
property subject to the oil and gas lease.” 87 The trial court interpreted this
language to mean that since Lessors only owned a portion of the 96 acres,
they agreed that “any royalties accruing under the lease . . . shall be reduced
accordingly.” 88 Lessors argued that this language did not alter the nonapportionment language but was included to serve as a “lesser interest

78. Id.
79. Id. at *4.
80. Id.
81. Id. This percentage was based on the fact that Schinkovec owned 6.1% of the Hupp
Lease lands, which comprised 21.96% of the total acreage included in the Unit.
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id. at *1.
84. Id.
85. Wettengel v. Gormley, 184 Pa. 354, 39 A. 57, 58 (1898).
86. Hildebrand, 2017 WL 2482850, at *4.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. at *2 (citing T.C.O., 5/20/14, at 4).
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clause.” 89 A lesser interest clause or proportionate reduction clause permits
a lessee to reduce royalty payments if a lessor actually owns less acreage
than represented in the executed lease.90 Based on the language contained
in the Hupp Lease and the subsequent modifications, the superior court
concluded that the non-apportionment language was not nullified by the
lesser interest clause in the 2009 Lessors Modification or by any provisions
contained in the neighbors’ modifications.91 The court reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Lessee and Schinkovec. 92
V. Commonwealth Court Cases
A. EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017).
The Commonwealth Court reversed Borough’s denial of a conditional
use permit for a natural gas wellsite.
The Borough of Jefferson Hills appealed an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County reversing the Borough Council’s
denial of a conditional use application submitted by EQT Production
Company and ET Blue Grass Clearing, LLC (the “Applicants”). 93 The
Commonwealth Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas, holding that
the burden shifted to the objectors to establish with probative evidence that
there was a high degree of probability that the conditional use would
constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and welfare exceeding
that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use. 94 Additionally, the
Commonwealth Court applied its recent decision in Gorsline v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 123 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015)
appeal granted, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016), and concluded that the evidence
presented by the objectors “did not constitute the requisite substantial
evidence to thwart the Applicants’ entitlement to a conditional use as a
matter of right.” 95
The Applicants filed a conditional use application to the Borough of
Jefferson Hills to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas production
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
2017).
94.
95.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554, 556 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 559-60.
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facility in an area zoned to permit oil and gas drilling as a conditional use. 96
The Borough Planning Commission unanimously recommended approval
of the application subject to the Applicants updating certain information
prior to the public hearing on the application. 97 However, the Borough
Council of the Borough of Jefferson Hills (the “Council”) unanimously
denied the application. 98
In its opinion accompanying the denial, the Council found that the
application failed to comply with the general requirement that “[t]he use
shall not endanger the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the
environment, as a result of being located on the property where it is
proposed, but otherwise satisfied the objective requirements of the
ordinance.” 99 The Council cited and gave substantial weight to testimony
offered by the objectors, but did not place the burden to prove that the
impact of the proposed use is such that would violate the other general
requirements for land use set forth in the Borough Zoning Ordinance.100
Moreover, the Council weighed the proposed use against the Environmental
Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution, finding that by
“approving the proposed conditional use application it would neither be
promoting the public health, safety and welfare, nor protecting the
environment from deterioration, when there is an acknowledged risk that
the activity the proposed conditional use allows undermines each of these
values.” 101
Without taking additional evidence or considering the Environmental
Rights Amendment, but relying on the Commonwealth Court’s decision in
Gorsline, the Court of Common Pleas reversed the Council’s denial of the
application. 102 The Court of Common Pleas concluded that the Council
erred in two regards: first, the Council erred in determining that the
Applicants failed to meet their burden of proving entitlement to a
conditional use; second, the Council should have shifted the burden of
presenting substantial evidence of any adverse impact on the public health,
safety and welfare on to the objectors. 103

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
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Affirming the Court of Common Pleas, the Commonwealth Court first
noted that under a conditional use application, “once an applicant
establishes compliance with the specific requirements of the ordinance, the
proposed use enjoys a presumption that it is consistent with municipal
planning objective and with the public health, safety and welfare.”104 The
objectors to the application must then prove “a high degree of probability
that permitting the conditional use will cause a substantial threat to the
community”—a threat greater than that which would normally flow from
the proposed use. 105 In sum, “once the Applicants satisfied the specific,
objective criteria for the conditional use, the burden shifted to the
The Commonwealth Court considered the objectors’
objectors.” 106
testimony, which provided general examples of harms posed by
unconventional oil and gas development, and concluded that it was
insufficient to meet that burden of proof that this specific well site
presented those harms. 107
In a closing note, the Commonwealth Court held that the Council’s use
of the ERA to supplement the conditional permit process was improper:
Council’s decision to augment the conditional use requirements
with criteria based on the ERA is tantamount to an attempt to,
sub silentio, abrogate the legislative determination that a
conditional use for oil and gas drilling is consistent with
municipal planning objectives and with the public health, safety
and welfare, including protection of the environment. Therefore,
once the Applicants met the specific requirements of the
ordinance, their proposed use enjoyed a presumptive consistency
with that legislative determination.108
B. Kiskadden v. Pa. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 149 A.3d 380 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2016), appeal denied No. 480 WAL 2016 (May 2, 2017).
The Commonwealth Court held that the Environmental Hearing Board
(“EHB”) did not abuse its discretion in determining that a well operator did
not cause environmental contamination.

104. Id. at 561 (citing Sheetz, Inc. v. Phoenixville Borough Council, 804 A.2d 113, 115
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 563.
108. Id. at 563-64.
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Appellant, Loren Kiskadden, appealed an order by the EHB dismissing
his appeal of a 2011 Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)
determination that natural gas drilling operations did not contaminate his
water well. 109 EHB found that he did not meet his burden of proving that
The
natural gas drilling operations contaminated the well.110
Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported
EHB’s findings of fact in its adjudication.111 Additionally, the court held
that EHB did not capriciously disregard materially competent evidence
demonstrating the existence of a hydrological connection between
Kiskadden’s water well and the natural gas operations at the Yeager Site.112
Finally, the court held that EHB did not err as a matter of law in relying on
speculative evidence to support its finding of fact that a hydrogeological
connection did not exist between the well and the Yeager Site.113
C. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017).
The Commonwealth Court held that unconventional wells qualified as
stripper wells excluded from well impact fees.
The Commonwealth Court reversed an order of the Public Utility
Commission (“PUC”), which held energy and production company Snyder
Brothers, Inc. liable for impact fees due under Act 13, 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§
2301–3504, for production from wells that Snyder Brothers argued were
excluded from the statute as “stripper wells.” 114 Under section 2302(d), a
“stripper well” does not have to pay impact fees.115 Section 2301 defines
“stripper well” as an “unconventional gas well incapable of producing more
than 90,000 cubic feet [cf] of gas per day during any calendar
month . . . .” 116 On appeal, the court had to determine whether the General
Assembly, in drafting Act 13, intended the word “any” to mean “one” or
“every.” 117

109. See Kiskadden v. Pa. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 149 A.3d 380, 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2016), appeal denied No. 480 WAL 2016 (May 2, 2017).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 400.
112. Id. at 402.
113. Id.
114. Snyder Bros., Inc., v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017).
115. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302(f) (West 2012).
116. Id. § 2301 (emphasis added).
117. Snyder Bros., 157 A.3d at 1020.
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PUC argued the term “any” in the definition of “stripper well” was
ambiguous because the word “any” was subject to multiple reasonable
meanings, as evidenced by the interpretations advanced by the parties.118
Snyder Brothers argued that PUC erred in finding ambiguity in the word
“any.” 119 The Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, sided with Snyder
Brothers and concluded that the word “any” in the definition of “stripper
well” is unambiguous and “it clearly and plainly means what it says—‘any
month.’ ” 120 The court gave limited deference to PUC’s findings because
its interpretation of the word “any” was presented in the course of litigation
and had not been previously articulated in an official rule or regulation.121
By concluding that the word “any” in the term “stripper well”
unambiguously means “any” or “one” and not, as PUC argued, “all” or
“every,” the court found that the facts established that the wells at issue
produced less than 90,000 cf of gas in at least one month and are “stripper
wells.” 122 Therefore, the court held that Snyder Brothers did not have to
pay impact fees for those wells.
D. Nat’l. Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D.
2016 & No. 195 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2,
2017).
The Commonwealth Court held that a wellpad and compressor station
held by separate but affiliated companies could not be aggregated for
purposes of determining the necessary air pollution control permit.
The Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded an order of the
Environmental Hearing Board (“EHB”) that affirmed the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s (“DEP”) Single
Source Determination aggregating a compressor station with a well pad
under a single air pollution control permit. 123 At issue was whether or not
Trout Run LLC’s Bodine Compressor Station and Seneca Resources
Corporation’s Well Pad E, which is exempt from air pollution control
permitting requirements, were “under the control of the same person (or
persons under common control)” which would allow DEP to aggregate both

118. Id. at 1021.
119. Id. at 1022.
120. Id. at 1023-24.
121. Id. at 1028.
122. Id. at 1030.
123. Nat’l. Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D. 2016 & No.
195 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2, 2017).
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facilities under the same permit. 124 Through differing analyses, both DEP
and EHB found the two sources could be aggregated despite being operated
by two separate companies and despite Well Pad E’s exemption from
permitting. 125 The court vacated the EHB decision and remanded to
determine either direct involvement by a common parent company in the
operations of both facilities or to pierce the corporate veil by showing that
the two entities are the alter ego of one another or their parent.126
DEP applied a three-part test to determine if more than one facility
should be considered a single air pollution source. 127 Under the test, two or
more facilities may be aggregated if they (1) belong to the same industrial
grouping (having the same first two digits of the Standard Industrial
Classification code); (2) are on one or more contiguous or adjacent
properties; and (3) are under the control of the same person (or persons
under common control). 128 Here, the only issue in dispute was that of
“control” under the third prong.
DEP found the corporate structure and common ownership of Seneca
Resources and Trout Run satisfied the control element of the three-part
test. 129 Seneca Resources, which owns and operates Well Pad E, is an oil
and gas exploration company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of National
Fuel Gas Company. 130 Trout Run is a wholly-owned subsidiary of National
Fuel Gas Midstream Corporation, which in-turn is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of National Fuel Gas Corporation.131 DEP found the Bodine
Compressor Station and Well Pad E to be under common control due to the
corporate relationships among Seneca Resources, Trout Run, and their
common owner, National Fuel Gas Corporation (though one step removed
EHB disagreed with the common
from Trout Run). 132
ownership/corporate-structure analysis used by DEP but still found
common control due to National Fuel Gas Corporation’s power to influence
or control the behavior of its subsidiaries through, in part, the “power of the
purse.” 133 EHB concluded that “it is the possession of the power to
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at *3.
See id. at *1.
See id. at *14.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
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influence or direct the behavior of the parties or the course of events, not
the actual exercise of that power that satisfies the requirement [for]
common control.” 134 Judge Labuskes, Jr. concurred in EHB’s opinion but
wrestled with the conundrum created by the decision: How can two
facilities be aggregated as a single source when one of those facilities is
actually exempt from permitting requirements?135 The court took note of
this question in reaching its conclusions.136
The court rejected both EHB’s and DEP’s definitions of control. First,
the court noted that DEP’s finding of control due to common ownership
abrogates the general rule that corporations are separate and distinct legal
entities, even if a corporation’s stock is owned by a single person, as is the
case with a wholly-owned subsidiary. 137 The court also found EHB’s
“power to influence” standard of control too lax, stating that “the term
‘control’ is more than the power to merely influence; it involves the power
to direct.” 138 Additionally, the court considered that DEP’s aggregation of
Trout Run’s Bodine Compressor Station with Seneca Resources Well Pad
E, which is exempt from permitting, ties the emissions thresholds of Trout
Run’s facilities to the emissions from a facility that is otherwise exempt
from permitting. 139 Aggregating both facilities could lead to liability and
enforcement consequences imposed on Trout Run due to the acts and
omissions of the exempt facility. 140 The court concluded
[u]nder the facts of this case, where one facility is exempt from
permitting requirements, but its emissions are still being
aggregated with another facility for purposes of that facility’s
permit, DEP is required to either demonstrate [National Fuel Gas
Corporation’s] direct involvement in the operations of Well Pad
E and the Bodine Compressor Station or pierce the corporate veil
by showing that the two entities are the alter ego of one another
or their parent. 141

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
See id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *10.
See id. at *12.
Id. at *12-13.
Id. at *13.
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VI. Federal Cases
A. Tiongco v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 214 F. Supp. 3d 279 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied
defendant Lessee’s motion for summary judgment on Lessor’s nuisance
claim, holding that there was issue of fact as to whether Lessee caused an
intentional nuisance on Lessor’s property.
Lessor entered into a lease with Southwestern Energy Production
Company (“SEPCO”), whereby Lessor received a bonus payment and
royalties in exchange for SEPCO producing oil and gas from a unit which
included Lessor’s property. 142 While the lease language was silent on the
matter, Lessor was allegedly told that there would not be any drilling within
miles of her property due to the location of a water source. 143
Subsequently, SEPCO engaged in drilling operations less than a quarter
mile from lessor’s residence, which according to Lessor created “excessive
noise, light and vibrations.” 144 Lessor filed a complaint against SEPCO
alleging private nuisance.145 SEPCO filed a motion for summary judgment
on three grounds: (1) the governing Susquehanna County noise and light
ordinances established the proper standards for evaluating alleged nuisance
activities; (2) the records failed to establish that SEPCO caused noise, light,
and vibration harms; and (3) Lessor’s testimony did not demonstrate that
SEPCO acted intentionally. 146
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 822:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either
a. intentional and unreasonable, or
b. unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, of for
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.147

142. Tiongco v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 214 F. Supp. 3d 279, 282 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
143. Id. at 282-83.
144. Id. at 283.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 285-86.
147. Id. at 284 (citing Butts v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., No. 3:12 CV 1330, 2014 WL
3953155, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2014)).
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As to SEPCO’s first argument, the district court held that county
ordinances were not dispositive of what constitutes a significant invasion. 148
Under Pennsylvania law, a “private nuisance [may] flow from the
consequences of an otherwise lawful act.” 149 SEPCO’s conduct could
comply with the county ordinance and still be found to constitute a private
nuisance under the community standards.150 The inquiry focuses on
whether SEPCO’s conduct constituted a significant and unreasonable
invasion of Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property. 151 Deciding
whether or not SEPCO’s conduct was unreasonable was a question of fact
for trial.
The district court also concluded Lessor produced sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that SEPCO was the legal cause of the private nuisance. 152
According to testimony, Lessor did not suffer from excessive noise, light,
and vibrations before signing the lease agreement with SEPCO, and the fact
that she observed SEPCO trucks driving to and from the drilling location
was evidence of a legal causal connection between the two. 153 There was
reasonable doubt as to whether SEPCO’s actions were a substantial factor
in the alleged injury, and thus, the question is left for the trier of fact.154
SEPCO’s third argument failed because Lessor produced sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that SEPCO did in fact act
intentionally. 155 Pennsylvania courts have not conducted an in-depth
inquiry into what constitutes “intentional” conduct for private nuisances.156
Some states have adopted the Restatement sections and have held that
intentional means “defendant’s knowledge that its conduct was invading the
use and enjoyment of one’s land;” 157 other state courts have found the test
to be whether “the creator of the condition intends the act that brings about
the condition.” 158 Regardless of which test is used, the Restatement makes
it clear that one need not intend to harm another party in order to be liable
148. Id. at 286-87.
149. Id. at 286 (quoting Liberty Place Retail Ass’n, L.P. v. Israelite Sch. of Universal
Practical Knowledge, 102 A.3d 501, 508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)).
150. Id. at 287.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 288-89.
153. See id. at 289.
154. Id. at 288-89.
155. See id. at 289-92.
156. Id. at 291.
157. Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 394 (Colo. 2001)).
158. Id. (quoting Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, 237 Conn. 135, 676 A.2d 795, 810
(1996)) (internal quotations omitted).
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for an intentional private nuisance.159 In this case, SEPCO need only know,
or be substantially certain, that its drilling activities will significantly
interfere with Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property. The district
court found there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to
conclude that SEPCO knew or was substantially certain, that its activities
were nevertheless invading Lessor’s use and enjoyment of her property.
The district court denied SEPCO’s motion for summary judgment on the
private nuisance claim. 160
B. Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Props. Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:16-0085, slip
op., 2017 WL 1078184 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017).
Lessors brought a class action against Lessees alleging various breaches
of the lease relating to payment of royalties.161 Lessees subsequently
brought a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
lack of personal jurisdiction with respect to one defendant Lessee, and for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 162
The lease language permitted the deduction of post-production costs, but
the addendum to the lease did not allow deduction of such costs. 163
Plaintiff alleged payments under the lease, which were made by both
defendant Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc. (“Statoil”) and Chesapeake,
were dramatically different due to the way the two entities calculated
royalties. 164 Chesapeake paid a royalty to leaseholders based on a price paid
by third-parties downstream of the wellhead. 165 Chesapeake’s royalty price
was based on the final natural gas product after the deduction of postproduction costs and was calculated using the sale price of that finished
product. 166 Statoil, on the other hand, sold at the wellhead, fixing the price
of the natural gas to a uniform hub price or index price for natural gas,
regardless of whether the natural gas was ever delivered to that particular
hub on the interstate pipeline system. 167

159. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825).
160. Id. at 292.
161. Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Props. Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:16-0085, slip op., 2017
WL 1078184, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at *3.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *3.
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The district court found that Statoil’s payments based on index price did
not violate the lease.168 The lease provided for royalty to be paid based on
the proceeds from the sale of the gas, rather than the market value of the
gas. 169 The price paid by Statoil at the wellhead was the price it received for
the gas. Therefore, the royalties were calculated properly. 170 Furthermore,
the district court rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Statoil’s sales to an affiliate
at the wellhead breached the lease, finding that no provision of the lease
forbade such sales. 171
The district court refused to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for breach of an
implied duty to market the gas. 172 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declined to adopt the “First Marketable Product Doctrine,” requiring Lessee
to bear all costs until the point of sale.173 However, the district court held
that allegations of a “sham sale” between Lessee and affiliated purchaser
were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. 174 The district court held
that Lessor was also entitled to an accounting against Statoil, relating to the
implied breach.175 Lessor’s remaining claims against Statoil’s midstream
affiliate were dismissed.176 Subsequently, the district court rejected
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 177
C. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:13-CV0725, 2017 WL 1173930 (M.D. Pa March 29, 2017).
The district court held that Defendants were legally entitled to access and
use as much of Plaintiffs’ surface property as was “reasonably necessary”
or “necessary and convenient” to extract oil and gas to effectuate the lease,
which included drilling wellpads and constructing roads.
Plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation, executed a lease with Anadarko
E&P Company, LP, who then assigned part of the lease to Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC, who then assigned part of its interest to Statoil Onshore
Properties, Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”). 178 Defendants notified
168. See id. at *17.
169. See id. at *2.
170. Id. at *18.
171. See id. at *17.
172. See id. at *21.
173. Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 605 Pa. 413, 430, 990 A.2d 1147, 1158 (2010).
174. Canfield, 2017 WL 1078184, at *24.
175. Id. at *19.
176. Id. at *25-27.
177. Id.
178. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2017 WL 1173930, at *1
(M.D. Pa. March 29, 2017).
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Plaintiff that they would be drilling a gas well on its property and installing
During
roads, access, and drainage, along with the well pad.179
construction, Defendants used rock, soil, mulch and other surface materials
found on Plaintiff’s property. 180 Plaintiff brought an action in state court
asserting trespass and misappropriation/conversion. 181 The action was
removed to the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania, and the district court
dismissed the trespass claim. 182 After failed mediation between the parties,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the claim of
misappropriation/conversion. 183
The lease provided:
Lessor hereby grants, demises, leases and lets exclusively to
Lessee the oil and gas, including coalbed methane gas,
underlying the land herein leased, together with such exclusive
rights as may be necessary or convenient for Lessee, at its
election to explore for, develop, produce, measure and market
production from the premises. . . . 184
Under the terms of the lease, Defendants were legally entitled to access and
use as much of Plaintiff’s surface property as was “reasonably necessary”
and “necessary and convenient” to extract the gas. 185 The district court
restated the general rule of law that
when anything is granted, all the means of attaining it and all the
fruits and effects of it are also granted; when uncontrolled by
express words of restriction, all the powers pass which the law
considers to be incident to the grant for the full and necessary
enjoyment of it. 186
The implied right to enter and use the surface property as was “reasonably
necessary” to construct the wellpad precluded a claim that the materials
were misappropriated or converted.
The court also considered the terms of the oil and gas lease, as controlled
by the principles of contract law: “The accepted and plain meaning of the
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
See id.
Id.
Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3 (citing Obehy v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 262 Pa. 83, 104 A. 864 (1918)).
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language used, rather than the silent intentions of the contracting parties,
determines the construction to be given the agreement.”187 In this case, the
terms were clear and unambiguous; therefore, “the intent of the parties is to
be ascertained from the document itself.”188 The lease contains the words
“necessary and convenient,” which are unambiguous, and there is no
dispute that in order to drill for oil and gas, Defendants needed to construct
a wellpad. 189
Finally, the court noted an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 190
Plaintiff never argued that the construction of the wellpad and road were
not “convenient or necessary,” and the question of necessity and
convenience was not a question for a jury; therefore, there was no genuine
issue of material fact.191
VII. Condemnations
A. In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P.: Challenges to Sunoco’s
Use of Eminent Domain
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. has faced continued legal challenges in the
Commonwealth Court to its use of eminent domain for construction of the
Mariner East 2 natural gas liquids pipeline. Building on its 2016 decision
in In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., (Sunoco I), 192 the
Commonwealth Court issued four decisions analyzing varying challenges to
Sunoco’s condemnation actions pursuant to the Mariner East 2 natural gas
liquids pipeline project.193
187. Id. at *5 (quoting Willison v. Consolidation Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 54, 637 A.2d 979,
982 (1994)).
188. Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385, 390
(1986)).
189. Valley Rod & Gun Club, 2017 WL 1173930, at *5.
190. Id. at *6-8.
191. Id.
192. 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), petition for allowance of appeal denied (Pa.
Nos. 571, 572, 573 MAL 2016, filed Dec. 29, 2019).
193. See In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 220 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
2062219 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 15, 2017) [Gerhart]; In re Condemnation by Sunoco
Pipeline, L.P., No. 565 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2291693 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 24, 2017)
[Homes for America]; and In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., No. 1306 C.D.
2016, 2017 WL 2303666 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 26, 2017) [Blume]. In these cases, the
Commonwealth Court upheld trial court orders overruling landowner objections to Sunoco’s
right to use eminent domain to take private property for the Mariner East 2 Project.
(Gerhart, Homes for American, and Blume all have petitions for allowance of appeal
pending before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.) See also In re Condemnation by
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In Homes for America, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Court of
Common Pleas of Lebanon County’s overruling of the Condemnee’s
Preliminary Objections to Sunoco’s Declaration of Taking. 194 Sunoco filed
a Declaration of Taking to condemn property necessary to the Mariner East
2 Project in Lebanon County. 195 The Condemnees objected, stating that (i)
Sunoco does not have authority to condemn; (ii) Sunoco’s corporation
resolution does not authorize Sunoco to use eminent domain for the
intrastate pipeline; (iii) Sunoco is collaterally estopped from asserting
eminent domain power due to Loper v. Sunoco Pipeline, L.P.; 196 (iv) the
Declaration of Taking falsely represented Mariner East 2 as an intrastate
pipeline; (v) Sunoco seeks approval for two pipelines despite that FERC
only approved one; and (vi) Pennsylvania law prohibits Sunoco’s attempt to
obtain eminent domain power under Pennsylvania Business Corporations
Law without a FERC Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity. 197 The record before the trial court in this matter is nearly
identical to the one made Sunoco I. 198
The entire opinion is consistent with Sunoco I, stating that “because . . .
these issues are directly controlled by this Court’s Sunoco I decision with
which the trial court’s decision is in accord, we affirm the trial court’s order
The second objection,
overruling [the Preliminary Objections].” 199
regarding the lack of authorization in the corporation resolution for the
second pipeline, is a newly presented argument, 200 the court disagreed and
cited Sunoco I for the proposition that “[a] [Certificate of Public
Convenience] issued by the PUC is prima facie evidence that the PUC has
determined that there is a public need for the proposed service and that the
holder is clothed with the eminent domain power.”201
Similar to Homes for America, the Appellants/Condemnees in Blume
sought review of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County’s
decision overruling Preliminary Objections to Sunoco’s Declaration of

Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., No. 2030 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2805860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 29,
2017) [Perkins].
194. Homes for America, 2017 WL 2291693, at *1.
195. Id.
196. No. 2013-SU-004518-05 (Ct. C.P. York Co. Feb. 24, 2014).
197. Homes for America, 2017 WL 2291693, at *2.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *9.
200. Id. at *6.
201. Id. (citations omitted).
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Taking. 202 Appellants set forth several issues on appeal that closely tracked
the issues raised in Homes for America. 203 The court found support in
Sunoco I for the trial court’s order overruling the objections but expanded
slightly on the “corporate resolution” argument raised in Homes for
America. 204 Here, the court noted that Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. introduced a
corporate resolution of Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP LLC. 205
Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations GP LLC is the general partner of
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. 206 The resolution, passed by Sunoco Logistics
Operations GP LLC, authorized Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., to perform all
necessary acts to effectuate the implementation of the ME2 project—
including acquiring all necessary rights of way. 207 Appellants’ property was
specifically identified as a property that would be condemned. 208 Therefore,
the court found that the trial court did not err in holding that the corporate
resolution complied with statutory requirements and Sunoco’s
condemnation was a valid exercise of the authority granted.209
In the next challenge, Appellants/Condemnees added an argument to the
“public interest” challenge, positing that the Property Rights Protection Act
(“PRPA”) 210 prevented condemnation because Sunoco is a private
corporation seeking to condemn land for private enterprise.211 In Gerhart,
the court disposed of the argument with two sentences:
[I]n Sunoco I, based upon essentially the same record as was
before common pleas in this matter, we held that Sunoco is a
public utility regulated by PUC. As PRPA expressly exempts a
202. See generally Blume, 2017 WL 2303666.
203. Id. at *2 (“Condemnees assert a number of grounds to support reversal of the trial
court. Although they enumerate nine issues on appeal, several are intertwined and can be
consolidated into the following: (1) whether the proposed pipeline is solely interstate,
subject only to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); (2)
assuming it is not, whether Condemnor has the power of eminent domain as a ‘public utility
corporation’; (3) whether there is a public need for the project; and (4) whether Condemnor
procedurally complied with all the legal requirements to condemn the property, i.e. passage
of appropriate corporate resolutions and posting of adequate bond”) (internal citations
omitted).
204. Id. at *7.
205. Id. at *6.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *7.
210. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 201-204 (West 2016).
211. Gerhart, 2017 WL 2062219, at *9.
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“public utility” as defined in Section 102 of the Code, 66 Pa.
C.S. § 102, from the general prohibition against taking property
for “private enterprise,” we conclude that PRPA does not bar
Sunoco’s Declaration for Condemnees’ property and therefore
affirm common pleas on this issue. 212
Gerhart also raised an argument that Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decision in Robinson Twp v. Commonwealth (“Robinson IV”), 213 which
struck down 58 Pa. C.S. § 3241 (giving a right of eminent domain to
corporations who transport, sell, or store natural gas), “reaffirm[ed] that
Sunoco cannot condemn the Condemnees’ property absent a finding that
the public is the ‘primary and paramount beneficiary.’ ” 214 Sunoco argued,
and the court agreed, that Robinson IV did not address the legality of
eminent domain exercised by public utilities certified and regulated by the
PUC. 215 Instead, Robinson IV was limited to private, non-regulated
corporations. 216
Building on Gerhart, the Commonwealth Court continued to uphold
Sunoco’s power of eminent domain in another of the several landowner
appeals objecting to that authority in Perkins. 217 Before the court was an
appeal of a trial court order overruling the landowner-condemnees’
(“Condemnees”) preliminary objections to Sunoco’s declaration of
taking. 218 In this matter, the Commonwealth Court undertook to fully
address objections raised under the PRPA, which prohibits the use of
eminent domain for private enterprise. 219 The trial court held that Sunoco, a
public utility possessing a Certificate of Public Convenience issued by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), is vested with the power
of eminent domain and falls into an exception to the PRPA. 220
The Condemnees appealed the trial court’s decision only to the extent it
overruled their objection stating Sunoco was prohibited by PRPA from
condemning private property because Sunoco is using the power of
condemnation for private enterprise.221 Section 204(a) of the PRPA
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016).
Gehart, 2017 WL 2062219, at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Perkins, 2017 WL 2805860, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
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expressly prohibits use “of the power of eminent domain to take property in
order to use it for private enterprise.” 222 That express prohibition is subject
to a number of exceptions, including for property taken by, “[a] public
utility or railroad as defined in 66 Pa. Con. Stat. § 102 (relating to
definitions).” 223 Finding that Sunoco fit the definition of “public utility”
under section 102, the court held that PRPA does not bar Sunoco
Declaration for taking the Condemnees’ property. 224
The Condemnees argued that the court’s analysis under the PRPA should
include a determination that the project is for the public’s benefit. 225
Resting on Sunoco I, the court explained that PUC already determined that
the Mariner East 2 project was in the public interest.226 Once PUC makes
that determination, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to review the
PUC’s adjudication. 227 Therefore, the trial court “did not err in not
engaging in a public use analysis.” 228

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (West 2016).
Id. § 204(b)(2)(i).
Perkins, 2017 WL 2805860, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
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